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Articles 
COMMON-LAW VOLUNTARINESS IN MARYLAND: GHOSTS, BARNACLES, AND 
ELUSIVE BRIGHT-LINE RULES 
By Andrew V. Jezic1 
I. Introduction: 
The admissibility of a confession poses complex 
questions that are often overlooked by many prosecutors 
and defense attorneys. According to Judge Charles Moylan, 
"[t]here is today among many members of the bar an 
intellectually undisciplined tendency to treat the Fifth 
Amendment privilege as little more than loose shorthand for 
confession law generally.''2 This impression that confession 
law is relatively uncomplicated stems, in part, from the 
promulgation of certain bright-line exclusionary rules which 
were originally designed to create clear guidelines for police 
interrogation. 111is article attempts to denlonstrate however , , 
that Maryland's bright-line exclusionary rule regarding non-
constitutional, common-law voluntariness is indeed more 
complicated than expected 
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. 
Alizona,3 by requiring thenow-familiar setofwamings prior 
to any custodial interrogation, attempted to establish bright-
line constitutional guidelines for custodial interrogation. 
According to Justice Sandra Day 0 'Connor, however, the 
unintended result has been that Miranda "creates as many 
close questions as it resolves .... And the supposedly 'bright' 
lines ... have turned out to be rather dim and ill defined."4 
In 2001 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
in Winderv. StateS reaffirmed its own bright-line, 
per se exclusionary rule for analyzing non-
constitutional, common-law voluntariness with 
respect to improper police promises. The Court 
rearticulated a "two-part test" that: 1) any implied or 
express police promise of "special consideration from 
a prosecuting authority or some other form of 
assistance;"6 and 2) which causes a suspectto make 
a statement, will render that statementinvoluntary. 
As a result, Maryland has one of the most expansive 
exclusionary rules on improper promises in the 
country.7 Yet, like the bright-line rules of Miranda, 
Maryland's per se bright-line exclusionary rule for 
common-law voluntariness creates almost as many 
close questions as it resolves. 
Among the issues that the Court of Appeals has not 
squarely addressed is whether the per se common-law rule 
applies with equal force to non-custodial interrogations. Also 
unclear is whether implied, improper threats are analyzed 
under the per se rule. Moreover, the Court has not quantified 
the precise measure of causation needed for an improper 
promise to render a statement involuntary - that is, whether 
the promise must only have a slight effect on the decision to 
confess or whether the promise must be the proximate cause 
of the confession. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has 
not defmitively addressed how the common-law standard 
should apply to the jUt)' instruction on voluntariness. 
The Court of Appeals has also not resolved whether 
certain promises are improper. Among these unresolved issues 
are: 1) the precise definition of an implied, improper promise; 
2) promises that are qualified by a police admonition that 
there are "no guarantees;" 3) promises to tell the prosecutor 
or judge of a suspect's cooperation, without promising 
leniency; 4) promises of mat erial items, unrelated to the court 
system; 5) promises regarding bail; 6) promises of counseling, 
without promising counseling in lieu of punishment; 7) 
promises to help a non-relative; 8) promises to help a relative 
with non-legal matters; 9) playing the "false friend" scenario; 
and 10) false promises, which are otherwise not inlproper. 
With so many unresolved issues in Maryland, one of 
the principal benefits of the per se, bright-line rule - clear 
guidelines for courts and law enforcement - has been 
rendered, at least at present, somewhat elusive. This should 
not, however, be unexpected. The dilemma of analyzing 
common-law voluntariness is that "despite over two centuries 
of judicial and legislative concern regarding promises, there is 
no consensus as to when if ever - even in themy- a suspect's 
decision to confess in return for such promises reflects the 
minimally sufficient autonomous choice that confession law 
should seek to assure."8 Similarly, the Supreme Court, which 
has "carefully sidestepped promise issues,"9 has stated that 
there is "no talismanic definition of'voluntariness,' mechanically 
32.1 U. Bait. L.F. 9 
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applicable to the host of situations where the question has 
arisen .... N]either linguistics nor epistemology will provide 
a ready definition of the meaning of'voluntariness. '''10 
The pwpose of this article is to outline the unresolved 
issues with respect to the common-Iawvoluntariness test and 
to provide arguments on both sides of each issue for both 
prosecutors and defense attorneys to utilize in court. 
II. Voluntariness-
A. Common Law Versus Due Process 
In a nutshell, the State must prove, upon proper 
objection, the voluntariness of a confession in several different 
contexts: 
A) In a motions hearing, the State has the burden to 
prove voluntariness, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, under Maryland, non-constitutional, 
conm1On law - that is, that the statement was 
not caused by any improper promises or threats; 
B) If the State prevails on the common law, 11 the 
State then has the burden to prove voluntariness, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, under the 
Federal Due Process Clause 12_ that is, that the 
defendant's will was not overborne, under the 
totality of the circun1stances, by coercive po lice 
conduct; 
C) Then, at trial, the State has the burden to prove 
to the trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the confession was voluntary. 
With respect to the common-law analysis of 
improper promises, the Court of Appeals in Winderv. State13 
explicitlyreaffim1ed the expansive per se exclusionary rule 
for improper promises in Hillard v. State, 14 which itself was 
a reaffinmtion of the common-law exclusionary rule stretching 
back to 1873 in Nicholson v. State. IS The Hillard Court 
"required [1hat] no confession or other significantly incriminating 
remark allegedly made by an accused be used as evidence 
against him, unless it first be shown to be free of any coercive 
ba17lacles that may have attached by improper means to 
prevent the expression from being voluntary.' '16 
32.1 U. Bait L.P. 10 
In defining "coercive barnacles," the Winder Court 
summarized the non-constitutional, common-law test as 
follows: 
Based on Hillard, we glean a two-part test 
to detem1ine the voluntariness of a custodial 
confession in circumstances where a 
defendant alleges that the police induced his 
or her confession by making improper 
promises. We will deem a confession to be 
involuntary, and therefore inadmissible, if I) 
a police officer or an agent of the police force 
promises or implies to a suspect that he or 
she will be given special consideration from 
a prosecuting authority or some other fonn 
of assistance in exchange for the suspect's 
confession, and 2) the suspect makes a 
confession in apparent reliance on the police 
officer's statement.17 
In applying this test, the Court of Appeals unanimously 
reversed three murder convictions and death penalty sentences 
based on several "egregious,"18 improper promises made by 
the police in Wicomico County. 
With respect to the constitutional analysis, in 
Dickerson v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that 
the federal due process analysis of voluntariness: 
refined the test into an inquiry that examines 
"whether a defendant's will was overborne" 
by the circun1Stances surrounding the giving 
of a confession .... The due process test 
takes into consideration the "totality of all of 
the surrounding circumstances - both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details 
of the interrogation" .... The detennination 
"depend[s] on a weighing of the 
circumstances of pressure against the power 
of resistance of the person confessing .... "19 
In other words, an improper promise is just one ofmany 
factors in the due process analysis of whether the defendant's 
will was overborne. However, when a confession results 
from physical brutality or other tactics which "shock the 
sensibilities of civilized society,''20' 'there is no need to weigh 
or measure its effects on the will of the individual victim.' '21 
Although the "primruy putpose" ofboth analyses "is 
to protect against government overreaching,"22 the 
voluntariness analysis under Maryland common law is 
generally more favorable to the defendant than the analysis 
under federal due process.23 The Maryland conunon-Iaw 
approach generally applies a "per se exclusionary rule''24 in 
which confessions causedby a limited set of police tactics-
improper promises and threats - are presumed to be 
involuntary, irrespective of actual coercion. In contrast, the 
federal constitutional approach focuses on whether any 
number of coercive police practices - including promises and 
threats, as well as deception and lengthy interrogations-cause 
the defendant, under the ''totality of the circumstances,''25 to 
be actually coerced into confessing.26 In short, under the 
conU110n-law approach, Maryland courts will not examine 
whether an improper promise caused the incarcerated 
defendant's will to be actually overborne. 
The due process test, however, is arguably more 
favorable to the defendant in one narrow area. If the police 
use certain coercive techniques to take advantage of a suspect 
whom they know has a substantial cognitive or psychological 
impairment, the Maryland common-law approach provides 
little protection.27 
Although Maryland courts have often stated that 
another underlying purpose of the conU110n-law test is 
"reliability," or "the belief that an involuntary or coerced 
confession is quite likely to be contrary to the truth,"28 
Maryland courts, at least in the past fifty years,29 have not 
actually analyzed the truthfulness of a particular confession 
or the likelihood that a particular interrogation technique would 
cause a false confession. While the conunon law in Mruyland 
does not explicitly prohibit an analysis of whether a particular 
confession is false, the constitutional test does explicitly forbid 
any evidentiary inquiry into the reliability, or truthfulness, of 
the confession itself.30 Nonetheless, the reliability of a 
confession is an important rationale underlying therequirement 
thattheStateprovevoluntariness,beyondareasonabledoubt, 
to tlle trier offact.31 
B. Is the Common-Law per se Rule Necessary For 
AllImproper Promises? 
Articles 
The per se common-law rule is not without its critics. 
Judge Moylan recently referred to the Hillard decision as a 
"misbegotten ghost."32 The per se rule is based on old 
Maryland cases, dating back to 1873,33 which themselves 
were based upon the expansive common-law per se 
exc1usionruyrule from eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
England.34 The primary focus of those old English cases was 
preventing unreliable confessions flowing fron1 certain in1proper 
promises, which were believed, in those days, to have an 
overpowering effect on certain suspects.35 The English courts 
"relied on intuition rather than empirical data to identify 
interrogation practices like1yto produce such confessions. ''36 
In 1884 in HopI v. Utah, the Supreme Court's first decision 
adopting a version of the common-law rule, the Cowtcriticized 
tl1e expansive common-law exclusionary rule as having "been 
carried too far."37 
This eighteenth/nineteenth century pel. se exclusionary 
rule which was "carried too far" is nearly identical to the 
holdings in HillarcP8 and, for the most part, in Winder: As 
such, tl1ere are several concerns witl1 this antiquated pedigree 
tl1at should be carefully reviewed in order to exanline whetller 
tl1e full force of Maryland' s common-law exclusionruy rul e is 
still necessary. 
First, several sociological studies dispute the notion 
that certain improper promises, short of promises of 
signijicant leniency, engender false confessions.39 Second, 
it can be argued that the per se common-law rule is 
unnecessary in recent times when the defendant now enjoys 
several layers of added protections - due process 
voluntariness, Miranda, the Sixth Amendment,40 and the 
State's burden to prove voluntariness, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, to the trier offact. 
Third, the per se standard was resurrected in 1979 
in Hillard by a Court of Appeals which may have been 
reacting to a justifiable fear during the seventies - that a 
conservative Supreme majority might overturn Miranda. 41 
F or example, in 1977 the Attorney General of Maryland, 
Francis Burch,joined twenty otller State Attorneys General 
in an Amicus Curiae brief forllie eventual decision in Brewer 
v. Williams ,42 urging that the Supreme Court abandon 
Miranda.43 By 1980, however, with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Rhode Island v. Innis,44 this fear appeared to be 
subsiding and, as a result of tl1e recent decision in Dickerson 
v. Uniled States ,45 did not actually come to pass. 
32.1 U. Bait. L.F. 11 
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Fourth, a Supreme Court decision from 1991 has 
influenced several other states in repudiating the common-
law rule.46 In Arizona v. Fulminante,47 the Court announced 
that the per se exclusionary rule for improper promises, as 
encapsulated in the 1897 Supreme Court decision, Bram v. 
United States, 48 "does not state the [constitutional] standard 
for detemrining the voluntariness of a confession." The Court 
inBrom held thattheperse common-law test for voluntariness 
is subsumed within the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination.49 The per se constitutional test 
enunciated in Bram is nearly identical to the holding in 
Hillmd. 50 Although the constitutional dictaS1 in Fulminante 
is by no means binding on the Court of Appeals in interpreting 
its own non-constitutional, common-law standard, 52 the 
Supreme Court's repudiation of such a venerated decision 
reinforces the need to evaluate the contemporary utility of 
the per se standard. 
Fifth, in a fifty-state survey, only a handful of states 
apply an exclusionary rule as expansive as that enunciated in 
Hillard and reaffmned in Winder (Florida,53 Maine,54 
Michigan,55 Mississippi,56 and South Carolina5?). Whilemany 
states have a variation of the per se HillardlWinder rule, 
most of these states have watered down the exclusionary 
force of the rule with selective holdings. Missouri,forexample, 
applies aper se exclusionatyrule only forpromisesof leniency, 
rather than for any promise ofbenefit.58 Several states have 
recognized exceptions for promises: 1) initiated by the 
defendant;59 2) regarding bail;60 3) to bring the suspect's 
cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor orjudge;61 4) 
which are implied;62 and 5) which are unrelated to the crime 
charged.63 Some states have adopted, by judicial fiat or 
statute, a modification of the common-law rule whereby only 
those promises likely to cause a false confession should be 
forbidden.64 Many states simply apply the federal due process 
test that examines whether the suspect's will was actually 
overborne.65 
Lastly, psychological literature indicates a greater 
possibility of an unreliable confession with certain implied 
threats than with improper promises. 66 Yet, from 1997 to 
200 1, Maryland appellate courts seemed to have developed 
a more "police friendly," "totality of the circumstances" 
st:'lndard for certain implied threats. 67 Similarly, the literature 
seems to indicate that certain types of deception -lying about 
physical evidence such as DNA - might be so ovelWhelming 
to some suspects such that an unreliable confession could 
32.1 U. BaIt L.F. 12 
result. 68 Yet, with respect to police deception, the Court of 
Appeals has consistently utilized the due process, "totality of 
the circumstances" approach.69 
Nonetheless, even though the Court of Appeals in 
Reynolds v. State noted "a pronounced trend [in other 
jurisdictions] away from per se exclusion and toward a totality 
ofthe circumstances approach,"70 the Court concluded that 
"Matyland has followed the old common-law rule, which has 
seemed to adopt aper se exclusion Rule .... "71 The Winder 
Court, without mentioning this majority trend in the country, 
simplyreaffinlled the expansive common-law exclusionary 
rule. Thus, the per se test, absent legislative action,72 is fimlly 
established in Maryland. Nonetheless, there are many 
permutations of the test which Ten1ain unresolved by the Court. 
C. The Present State of the Maryland Law of 
Voluntariness 
1. With Respect to Improper Promises, the Court of 
Appeals will not Examine Whether the Defendant's 
Will was in fact Overborne. 
The common-law approach presumes coercion, 
upon the showing that an inlproperpromise is causally related 
to a subsequent confession. The common-law approach 
"relieves the defendant of the burden of showing that his will 
was, in fact, overborne by such an influence. "73 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals in Winderv. State 
did not analyze whether the defendant's will was "overborne," 
or actually coerced, as is done in the due process approach. 
The Winder Court did utilize, once, the term "coerced" to 
describe the effect of improper promises on the accused. 
The Court stated, "[w]e look to all of the elements of the 
interrogation to determine whether a suspect's confession .. 
. was coerced through the use of improper means." 74 This 
limited use of the concept of coercion was consistent with the 
one-time reference to "coercion" in Hillmd.75 
In so holding, the Winder Court scaled back a trend 
in the Court of Appeals from 1986 to 1997 to assimilate the 
common-law analysis with the "totality of the circumstances" 
analysis. This trend, which applied the "totality of the 
circumstances" testto both the common-law and the due 
process analysis, began in Lodowski v. State76 in 1986, was 
favorably mentioned in Reynolds v. State77 in 1992, and 
then appeared nearly completed in Ho/v. State78 in 1995. 
The trend toward assimilation of the "totality of the 
circumstances" analysis and the common-law test seemed 
actually accomplished in Burch v. State in 1997.79 Judge 
Wilner,80 writing for the Court, summarized the two tests as 
follows: 
Under State common law, a confession or 
other significantly incriminating remark may 
not be used as evidence against a defendant 
unless, in the metaphoric words of Hillard 
v. State, it is "shown to be free of any 
coercive barnacles that may have attached 
by improper means to prevent the 
expression from being voluntary." 1nplain 
English, that means that, "under the 
totality of all of the attendant 
circumstances, the statement was given 
freely and voluntarily." The "totality of the 
circun1Stances" test also governs the analysis 
of voluntariness under the State and Federal 
Constitutional provisions.8! 
Consistent with this trend, the Winder Court 
conceded that, "we generally look at the totality of the 
circumstances affecting the interrogation and confession .... 
[T]o detennine whether a suspect relied upon an offer of 
help from an interrogating authority in making a confession, 
we exanune the particular facts and circumstances surrounding 
the confession. "82 However, the Court did not actually apply 
an unqualified "totality of the circumstances" test and did 
not examine whether the defendant's will was overborne. 
Rather, the Court applied the "particular facts and 
circumstances" (not necessarily the "totality of the 
circumstances') to the causation prong of the common-law 
analysis. 
As such, the Court only examined a narrow set of 
factors among those catalogued by the Court of Appeals in 
Hof v. State, as part ofthe "totality of the circumstances" 
test. 83 The Winder Court did not analyze the defendant's age, 
intelligence, maturity, education, or experience with custodial 
interrogation. Moreover, the Court did not exan1ine the degree 
to which the defendant was restrained (e.g., handcuffs), the 
number of interrogating officers, the size of the room, the 
distance of the interrogation from familiar surroundings, the 
tone and volume of the interrogators' voices, whether the 
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defendantwasphysica11ynUstreated,orwhetherthedefendant 
was deprived offood and water.84 Thus, as described in 
Martin v. State, the Winder Court simply engaged in a general 
"cause-and-effect" analysis.85 
2. Does the Common-Law Exclusionary Rule Apply 
Only to a "Custodial Confession?" 
The Winder Court stated that the common-law 
exc1usionaryrule applies to a "custodial confession."86 The 
Court, therefore, implied that there is no per se rule of 
exclusion with respectto improper promises made in a non-
custodial setting. The Court crafted this arguable requirement 
of custody from dicta in Reynolds v. State, which had restated 
the Maryland common-law per serule in the context ofa 
"defendant in custody."87 Quoting from several text writers, 
the Court of Appeals in Reynolds stated: 
[1]t is the defendant's sensitivity to 
inducement while in custody and the 
potential impact of the pronUse ofleniency 
that render the confession inadmissible. 
Courts abhor, or at least find distasteful, 
promises ofleniency or immunity made by 
state agents to defendants subject to the 
vuh1erability of custodial interrogation.88 
Whether consistent with this dictum in Reynolds or 
by historical accident, not one case from the Court of Appeals 
has actually applied a per se common-law analysis to a 
statement taken in a non-custodial setting. In 1997 in In re 
Eric F, the Court of Special Appeals applied a ''totality of 
the circumstances" test, rather than a per se analysis, to an 
allegedly improper inducement made to a seventeen-year-
old suspect who was not in custody.89 It remains to be seen 
if custody is not present, whether the Court of Appeals will 
apply an unqualified' 'totality of the circumstances" testto an 
improper pronUse, as was done in In re Eric F, or will retain 
the per se exclusionary rule. 
On the other side of the issue, there does not appear 
to be any case from the Court of Appeals prior to Reynolds 
in 1992 which stated that custody was a prerequisite for the 
application of the common-law exclusionary rule. 
Furthennore, it could be argued that ifthe Court of Appeals 
viewed custody as a prerequisite to the operation of the per 
32.1 U. BaIt. L.P. 13 
Articles 
se common-law rule, the Court in two cases involving non-
custodial statements, Reynolds andPappaconstantinou,9o 
would not have mentioned the common-law analysis. Instead, 
the Court devoted several pages of analysis to different aspects 
of the common-law rule in both cases. The Court of Special 
Appeals in Minehan v. State recently analyzed the common-
law test wi1b respectto allegedly improper promises and threats 
in a non-custodial setting; however, the court did not have to 
apply the common-law analysis because it first ruled thattl1e 
alleged inducements were not improper.91 
Furthemlore, in Stokes v. State, a case in which the 
defendant was at least detained during a search warrant, the 
Court of Appeals did not imply that custody or detention 
was a prerequisite for the operation ofthe per se rule.92 The 
Court held as involuntary t11e defendant's statements which 
were made in response to po lice threats to arrest his wife.93 
One commentator has argued that promises or threats 
regarding third persons would be no less coercive if the 
defendant were not incarcerated.94 
3. Does The Common-Law per se Rule Apply to Implied 
Threats? 
Maryland courts have sometimes analyzed implied 
tlrreats undertl1e due process, "totality oft11e circumstances" 
test, rather than under the common-law test. The Winder 
Court appeared to leave open the possibility that there may 
indeed be, as Judge Moylan noted in Martin v. State,95 an 
"aberrational little pocket dealing witl1 t11e impact of promises 
(though not necessarily of threats) under Maryland 
conmlon law. ''96 The Winder Court explicitly held that the 
conmlon-Iaw per se test applied to improper pmmises97 and 
characterized the improper police statements at issue as 
improper promises, rather than threats: "Of course, as 
Appellant argues, most oft11e statements we have recounted 
can be construed as threats as well as promises. We have 
not considered the police statements as tlrreats for purposes 
of our analysis because, as promises alone, t11ey rise to t11e 
level of actionable impropriety. ''98 In t11e due process context, 
the Supreme Court in 1991 in Arizona v. Fulminante 
rej ected the per se test, as embodied in Bram, with respect 
to a "credible tlrreat of physical violence."99 
Some other recent cases do appear to draw, albeit 
implicitly, a distinction between the analysis applied to implied 
threats and promises. In 1997 in Burch v. State, where 
32.1 U. Balt L.F. 14 
promises were not at issue, t11e Court of Appeals applied an 
unqualified "totality of the circumstances" approach to a 
continuingtlrreatfrom prior physical violence inflicted upon 
the defendant. 100 After Winder, t11e Court of Special Appeals 
in Raras v. State relied on Burch in applying the "totality of 
ilie circumstances" test to an allegedly inlproperthreat. 101 In 
2001 in Jackson v. State, 102 a case involving a continuing 
threat of physical abuse oft11e suspect, t11e Court of Special 
Appeals quoted from Burch in asserting that the common-
law test is governed by the "totality of the circumstances" 
test. 
By comparison, while Maryland appellate courts 
sometimes apply the "totality oft11e circumstances" testto 
implied threats, this test has almost never been actually 
applied to examine t11e causation from an improper promise. 
From 1986 and 2001, in most instances in which t11eCourt 
of Appeals mentions an unqualified "totality of the 
circumstances" test, promises were eit11ernot at issue ort11e 
Court did not have to actually analyze the effect of an improper 
promise.103 
On the other side ofthe argument, the vast majority 
of Maryland cases have not mentioned any difference in t11e 
analysis between threats and promises. In Nicholson v. 
State, 104 and a long line of subsequent cases from the Court 
of Appeals, t11e Court recited the same test for promises and 
threats.105 For example, the Court in 1980 in Stokes v. State 
applied t11e common-law rule and held t11at "a promise not to 
arrest a nearrelative of the defendant, or a threat to do so, 
constitutes the fonn ofinducenlentwhich will render a resulting 
statementinvoluntary."I06 In Wznderitself, t11eCourtstatedin 
dicta iliat the first part of the Hillard test is to "detemline 
whether the police or a State agent made a threat, promise, 
orinducement."107 InHofv. State, Judge Moylan stated that 
a "conditional promise is, by definition, a threat in the 
eventuality t11e condition is not satisfied. "108 He went on to 
quote MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE: 109 "Whether an 
interrogator's language will be construed as promising a benefit 
or as tlrreatening a detriment in such situations is a matter of 
very subjective choice." O1her commentators agree t11at, "t11e 
relative morality of purchasing a confession wit11 [a promise] 
as opposed to obtaining one by use oftlrreats lies very much 
in the eye of the beholder."l1 0 
A recent 4-3 decision from the Court of Appeals in 
Pringle v. State, III placed in some doubt the existence of 
any significant distinction between improper threats and 
promises. In Plingle, the police detained three passengers 
in a car that contained cocaine in a closed compartment in the 
back seat. The defendant, who was not the registered owner, 
was in the front passenger seat. The officer told the detained 
passengers after finding the drugs, "if no one admitted to 
ownership of the drugs he was going to arrest them all. "112 
No one responded, and the officer placed all three passengers 
under arrest. Two hours later, the defendant confessed after 
waiving hisMiranda rights. After concluding that there was 
no probable cause for the arrest, the Court perfonned a Fourth 
Amendment attenuation analysis of the taint of the illegal arrest 
on the confession. I 13 As part of this taint analysis, the Court 
conducted an "exploration ofvoluntariness" of the confession 
and concluded that there was no attenuation ofthe "coercive 
effect" of the "inducement" (threat) that had occurred two 
hours earlier. 
The Pringle Court indicated in several ways that it 
was, in effect, conducting aper se common-law analysis of 
the voluntariness of the threat The Court recited the common-
law test, but did not quote any due process cases, nor make 
mention of whether the defendant's will was overborne. I 14 
Most recently, the Court of Special Appeals in Minehan v. 
Statel15 analyzed alleged threats in the common law context 
without mentioning the "totality of the circumstances." 
It can also be argued that courts should give the 
defendant more protection from police threats than from 
improper promises. For instance, the threat to arrest a loved 
one, by its very nature, is more coercive than a promise not 
to arrest a loved one. 116 In fact, studies indicate that people 
perceive threats to be more coercive upon the subject's 
decision to confess than direct or implied promises. 117 For 
example, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that, while it 
may be pemrissible to promise the suspect to tell the prosecutor 
of his cooperation, it is impennissible to tell the suspect that 
his failure to cooperate will be communicated to the 
prosecutor. I 18 
The Court of Appeals has expressed no ambiguity, 
however, in holding that threats pertaining to constitutional 
rights will render the subsequent statement involuntary. In 
Thiess v. State,119 the threat to keep the suspect held 
incommunicado until he confessed rendered a confession 
involuntary. In Lewis v. State,120 the Court of Appeals 
indicated that it was improper for a detective to make a threat 
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that the defendant would be labeled a murdererifhe requested 
a lawyer. 
4. What Measure of Causation is Required from the 
Improper Influence? 
What if the defendant was only slightIy influenced by 
an improper promise? What if the defendant was plimarily 
influenced by genuine remorse, but also by an improper 
promise? Maryland appellate courts have seldom addressed 
the precise measure of causation required by the common-
law rule. 
Notably, in thefirstvoluntariness case in Maryland, 
Nicholson v. State, the defendant argued that "[t]he law does 
not measure the force of the influence used, or decide upon 
its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and therefore excludes 
the declaration, if any degree of influence was exerted."121 
The Court of Appeals, however, did not reach this issue 
because the Court accepted the trial court's factual finding 
that the officers' denials of any in1proper promise or threat 
were credible. In 1887 in Biscoe v. State, the second case 
in Maryland involving improper promises, the Court conceded 
that, "[i]tis not, of course, an easy matter to measure in aU 
cases the force of the influence used, or to decide as to its 
precise effect upon the mind of the prisoner .... "122 However, 
the Court again did not reach the issue of how to measure the 
influence of tIle inducement. 123 
Despitehaving identifiedthe issue in these early cases, 
the Court of Appeals has not squarely decided the precise 
measure of causation needed for an improper influence to 
render a statement involuntary. The W'inderCourt only stated: 
The second prong offue Hillardtest triggers 
a causation analysis to detern1ine whether 
there was a nexus between the promise or 
inducement and the accused's confession. 
In Reynolds, we made clear that "[i]f a 
suspect did not rely on an interrogator's 
comments, obviously, the statement is 
admissible regardless of whether the 
interrogator had articulated an improper 
inducement .... As to the second factor, 
the reliance, or nexus, between the 
inducement and the statement, to detemrine 
whether a suspect relied upon an offer of 
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help from an interrogating authority in making 
a confession we examine theparticularfac1s 
and circumstances surrounding the 
confession.l24 
In Winder, the Court engaged in a general "cause-
and-effect" analysis that considered a few "attenuat[ing]" 
factors, such as the timing of the inducement in relation to the 
confession, the level of intimidation felt by the defendant, any 
"intelVening" factors (new interrogation locations), and the 
flagrancy of the police conduct. 125 The Court also emphasized 
that the timing of the confession in relation to the inducement 
was "critical. "126 The Court stated as well that "a singular 
[police] statement communicated to the suspect may be 
sufficient to qualifY as an inappropriate offer ofhelp. "127 
The Winder Court considered two cases which also 
seemed to apply a general "cause-and-effect" analysis that 
considered some attenuating factors. 128 One of the cases cited 
was Johnson v. State, 129 in which the Court of Appeals held 
as voluntary a confession that was given three days after a 
statement that had been involuntarily induced by an improper 
promise. The voluntary confession three days laterwas given 
to another officer at another place, and neither the officernor 
the defendant mentioned the improper promise. 130 
Neither Winder nor Johnson discussed prior 
Maryland cases that had adopted amore stringent (' 'defendant-
friendly') rule of causation. For example, in 1950 in Edwanis 
v. State, the Court examined the effect of an improper 
inducement on two subsequent statements made two hours 
and thirteen hours, respectively, after the first confession was 
improperly induced by a promise. 131 The Court stated that 
the "improper influence which produced the first confession 
is presumed to still be in effectuntil a cessation of that influence 
is definitely shown, and the evidence to overcome and 
rebut such a presumption must be clem; strong, and 
satisfactOty, and any doubt on this point is resolved in 
favor of the accused. "132 The Court suppressed the second 
and third confessions. Also, in Kier v. State, the Court, citing 
Edwards, suppressed a second confession made fourteen 
days after the first improperly induced confession.133 Edwards 
and Kier, however, might be distinguished because they 
involved the effect of an improper inducement and a prior 
confession upon a subsequent confession. 
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In 1996 in Martin v. State, the Court of Special 
Appeals offered a more precise description of the necessary 
measure of causation: "If the inducement is shown to have 
some, even if only slight, influence on a subsequent confession, 
the per se exclusion approach creates a conclusive 
presumption that the influence was dispositively catalytic and 
relieves the defendant of the burden of showing that his will 
was in fact overborne by such influence. "134 
The Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Conte, 
an opinion with a nearly identical per se test as Hillani, held 
that a promise "must have more than an attenuated causal 
connection with the confession, but need not be the only or 
even principal motivating factor."135 The Supreme Court of 
Mississippi, which also has an exclusionary rule as expansive 
as Hillard, uses the term "proximate cause"136 to measure 
the influence of the improper promise upon the subsequent 
statement. 
5. Did Winder N arrow The Definition of An Improper 
Promise? 
The WInder Court may have narrowed the definition 
of an improper promise by defining it as "special consideration 
from a prosecuting authority or some other form of 
assistance in exchange for the suspect's confession .... "137 
The Hillard Court had stated a broader definition - "help or 
some special consideration' '-without mentioning "prosecuting 
authority. "138 
This arguably narrowed definition in Winder is 
consistent with an older, and subsequently abandoned, line 
of Maryland cases from 1961 to 1965. In 1961 in Presley 
v. State, the Court of Appeals stated that the State must 
prove that a confession was not caused by a "promise, threat 
or inducement whereby the accused might be led to believe 
that there would be a partial or total abandonment of 
prosecution."139 In several subsequent cases140 the Court 
restated this narrowed definition until it appeared for the last 
time in 1965 in Smith v. State. 141 
This narrower definition of an improper promise is 
consistent with Hopt v. Utah, the Supreme Court's first case 
on connnon-law vo1untariness.142 In Hopt, the Supreme Court 
held that a confession is involuntary ifmade "in consequence 
ofinducemen1s ... touching the charge prejen-ed. "143 Even 
in 1897 inBram v. United States, Hillard's ancestral role 
model, the Supreme Court reiterated this qualification that 
the improper influence must relate to the "crime charged. "144 
Furthennore, this narrowed definition is arguably consistent 
with the Court's statement in Reynolds v. State that, 
"[g]enerally the type ofinducernents that rendered confessions 
inadmissible at common law were inducements extreme 
enough to make confessions unreliable and which directly 
impacted on the accused or the crime chmged."145 
1bis narrowed definition is also consistent with recent 
sociological studies indicating that rninor prornises, which do 
not offer substantial help with the suspect's sentence or 
likelihood of acquittal, are unlikely to produce a false 
confession. Professor Welsh White, who has written several 
articles criticizing police promises, threats, and deception, 
concluded that: 
As Wigmore observed, the premise that 
confessions produced by any promises are 
untrustworthy was probably never 
con'ect. If the inducement to confess is 
relatively slight - a promise that the officer 
will testify that the suspect cooperated, for 
example - there is little reason to believe 
that a suspect will respond with a false 
confession ... [However, regarding] a 
promise of significant leniency, empirical 
data as well as intuition suggest that even an 
innocent suspect will be quite likely to 
confess rather than risk the consequences 
of maintaining his innocence. 146 
Some language in Winder, however, suggests the 
contrary. The Court's use ofthe phrase "or some other foml 
of assistance" could be interpreted as a reaffimmtion of an 
expansive definition of an improper promise. The Court did 
not expressly couple this phrase with the qualifier, "from a 
prosecuting authority. "147 With the exception ofthe cases 
discussed above from 1961 to 1965, and the dicta in 
Reynolds, the Court of Appeals has consistently applied a 
broaddefmition of an improper promise, For example, in 
Nicholson v. State, 148 the Court defined an improper promise 
as "any promise of worldly advantage." The Court repeated 
the Nicholson definition in Reynolds, 149 HoJI50 and WInde,: 151 
In 1980 the Court in Stokes v. State broadly stated that the 
"rule in Hillard announces that a statement is rendered 
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involuntary if it is induced by any official promise which 
redounds to the benefit or desire of the defendant. "152 
One court in recent years has broadly interpreted an 
improper promise to include a material benefit unassociated 
with the pending case. The Court of Special Appeals in In re 
Joshua David C. quoted the Nicholson definition in holding 
that an officer's promiseofa tee shirt to a ten-year-oldchild 
rendered the subsequent statement involuntary. 153 
a. What is an Implied Promise? 
The Winder Court established an "obj ective" test 
for detennining whether the police actually communicated a 
direct or implied promise. First, a statement will not be 
suppressed just because the defendant sincerely believed that 
he would receive some benefit for his confession, without 
any evidence that his beliefwas reasonably "premised on a 
statement or action made by an interrogating officer."154 
Second, the Winder Court held that, "[a ]lthough a defendant 
need not point to an express quidpro quo, ... a promise or 
offer within the substance of the officer's eliciting statement" 
is required. 15S Third, the Court may have narrowed the 
definition of an improper promise by not adopting language 
from previous cases that any' 'promise, however slight" would 
constitute an inducement. 156 
The Court of Appeals has most often analyzed an 
inlpliedpromise in the context of the police statement, "it would 
be better for the defendant to talk." In Ball v. State, the 
Court held as voluntary the defendant's written version of a 
prior oral confession, despite the detective's statement that it 
wouldbe "much better if you told the StOIY ... tothejury .. 
. so thatitis your words not mine .. .. "157 111Ralph v. State, 
the Court of Appeals suggested that when there is no improper 
police statement or action, otherthan the admonition, "it is 
better to tell the truth," an improper promise will not be 
found. 158 In Deems v. State, the police statement, "the truth 
would hurt no one," was not an improper inducement. 159 
Similarly, the Court of Special Appeals in In re Owen F 
found no implied promise when the officer told a fourteen-
year-old with an IQ ono, "I think itis better if you tell me."160 
However, in Biscoe v. State the statement, "it would 
be better to tell the truth. , . and have no more trouble about 
it," was held to bean inlproperpromise-one "of the strongest 
kind. "161 In Dobbs v. State, the prosecutor s statement, "Tell 
the truth. You have nothing to fear, if you weren't in it," was 
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held to be an implied promise. 162 In Lubinski v. State, the 
Court of Appeals stated that the police statement, "It will 
help you a lot [if you give a statement]" would be an improper 
inducement.163 In In reLucas F, the Court of Special Appeals 
held that the exhortation to tell the truth, "so there would be 
no problen1Iater," was improper. l64 ChiefJudge Gilbert wrote 
that the exhortation sowed the "seeds of a subauditur in the 
[ten-year-old defendant's] mind thatifhe related the events 
that transpired ... he would avoid subsequent problems. "165 
Studies do indeed show that implied promises of 
leniency may be interpreted in almost the same way as direct 
promises. Suspects process information "between the lines."I66 
Thus, the "difference between expressions of compassionate 
understanding on the one hand, and implied promises of 
leniency on the other, is at the margins sometimes a matter of 
emphasis and nuance. "167 
b. Qualified Promises - Implied, Improper Promises 
Accompanied by the Warning that Nothing Can Be 
Promised. 
Another difficult issue arises when the police warn 
the suspect that the police cannot make any promises, and 
then proceed to make an implied promise. In 1887 in Biscoe 
v. State, the interrogator told the defendant he could make 
no promises to the defendant, but then told the defendant, ''It 
would be better for him to tell the truth, and have no more 
trouble about it. "168 The Court of Appeals observed, "But 
what does this amountto when, in the next breath, we find 
him [making a promise ]?"169 The Court held the subsequent 
confessiontobeinvoluntaty. However, in 1958 in Merdtant 
v. State, the Court of Appeals held that because the defendant 
was told that anything he said can be used against him, there 
couldbe no improper promise implied in the police statement, 
"The truth hurts no one."170 
In 1990 the Court of Special Appeals in Watters v. 
State held that certain implied promises were not improper 
because the officer repeatedly reminded the defendant that 
he could not promise him anything. 171 The officer told the 
defendant, "I can't promise that you are going to walk out of 
j ail, okay? ... I am giving you the opportunity to tell us what 
you knOw. I can't say whether that is going to help you, I 
can't say that itis not going to help you, because I am not in 
thatposition."172 Most recently, the Court of Special Appeals 
in Minehan v. State held that a suspect "could not reasonably 
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believe the officers would ensure his case was handled with 
leniency" because the police warned the suspect several times 
that the po lice could "not promise [him] anything. "173 
c. Short of a Promise to Advocate for Leniency, a 
Promise to Tell the Prosecutor or Judge of the 
Defendant's Cooperation 
In Hillard v. State, the Court found a statement 
involuntary which was made in reliance upon the officer's 
promise "to go to bat" for the defendant with the 
prosecutor. 174 However, the Court has never directly ruled 
on a promise simply to inform the prosecutor or judge of the 
defendant's cooperation, without promising to advocate for 
leniency. In Winder, the Court of Appeals characterized the 
various improper offers of help made to the defendant by 
three different officers as fo Hows: "to contact the prosecuting 
authorities in order to provide him leniency during his 
subsequent prosecution. The officers purportedly would cany 
out their offers by advocating on Appellant's behalf to the 
state's attorney and the judge presiding over his anticipated 
trial."175 
In Grammer v. Statein 1953, the Court of Appeals 
imp lied that a promise to tell the judge of the defendant's 
cooperation might be problematic. The officer told the suspect 
that "at the time of court ... it would be testified to that he had 
cooperated with us in making a statement."176 However, 
because the questionable promise was made after the 
confession, the court did not have to rule on whether there 
was an improper promise. 177 In Hall v. State, the Court of 
Appeals expressly declined to rule on a sin1ilar question.178 
In contrast, in Boyer v. State, the Court of Special 
Appeals held that it was not improper for the officer to tell the 
defendantthatthe officer would tell the prosecutor of the 
defendant's cooperation.179 Similarly, Professor White, who 
has written extensively on the problem of false confessions, 
conceded that this type of promise is unlikely to lead to a 
false confession. 180 The overwhelming majority of states has 
held that promises of this nature are not improper. lSI 
d. Promises of a Material Item, Unrelated to the Case 
The Court in Reynolds v. State noted that 
"[p ]romises of purely collateral benefits do not generally reach 
a level that undermines the voluntariness of a confession. "182 
In In re Joshua David c., the Court of Special Appeals 
applied the common-law exclusionmy rule to an involuntary 
confession made by a ten-year-old who was promised a tee 
shirt.l83 The court cited Nicholson v. State, which prohibited 
a "promise of worldly advantage."184 In 1968 in Lyter v. 
State, an implied promise to help the defendant get a job 
when he got out of jail was held to be improper.185 InMitchell 
v. State, the defendant alleged that the police promised to 
return the defendant's car to his wife.186 The Court of Special 
Appeals did not have to analyze the promise about the car 
because the trial court believed the officers' testimony that 
they had offered no inducements. 
e. Promises Regarding Bail 
Although no Maryland appellate court has squarely 
held that promises related to bail are improper, there are ample 
dicta to indicate that such promises would be improper. The 
Hillard Court did not specifically hold that the improper 
promise "to go to bat" with the prosecutor related to bail. 
However, the trial judge appeared to find that the promise 
related to the question ofbond. 187 Similarly, the Court of 
Special Appeals in Whack v. State stated that "promises to 
reduce bail ... may act to vitiate the voluntariness of a 
confession."188 In Ponds v. State, the Court of Special 
Appeals stated the confession would have been involuntaI)' if 
the trial court had believed the defendant's allegations that 
the police would recommend "personal bond" in exchange 
for coopemtion. 189 
However, in Pharr v. State, although the court did 
not have to decide the propriety of a police promise to get 
the defendant out on bond, the court did not explicitly state 
that such a promise was improper. 190 Furthennore, regarding 
a detective's effort to convince the defendantthat he was not 
in custody, the Court of Special Appeals in In re Etic F held 
that it was not an improper promise for the detective to tell a 
suspect that whatever the suspect said, the suspect would 
"go home ... thatnight."191 
f. Promises Regarding Counseling (not in lieu of 
punishment) 
What if the police promise psychological assistance 
dwingthe suspect's eventual j ail sentence rather than in lieu 
of it? The Court of Appeals has not addressed this issue. 
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The Winder Court, however, did indicate that the 
following police statement was an improper inducement "We 
think the person who committed these [acts] needs help. I 
think you need help. The only way we can get you that help 
is for you to let us know what happened. We can let the 
State's Attorney's Office know .... "192 The Court 
characterized the officer's statement as a promise to help 
''with obtaining psychological assistance and leniency from 
the prosecuting authority. "193 In Johnson v. State, the Court 
found that a statement was "properly suppressed" because it 
had been induced by a promise of psychological treatment. 194 
There, the trooper stated that if the defendant confessed to 
themurder''hemightbeabletoreceivesomesortof'medical 
treatment at Perkins' instead of being 'locked up for the rest 
of [his] life ... .' "195 
g. Promises Regarding Privacy 
In 1937 in Marldey v. State, the Court of Appeals 
didnot find improper a police promisetokeep1he defendant's 
name out of the "published statements on the case. "196 The 
Court held that an assumnce of secrecy, short of a promise 
notto prosecute, does not render a confession inadmissible. 197 
In 1943 in Ford v. State, the Court of Appeals did not find 
improper a promise to tear up the detective's notes at the end 
of the interrogation. 198 However, a promise to keep a 
defendant's statement confidential, beyond the narrow 
holdings of Markley and Ford, will surely result in an 
involuntaI)' statement. 
h. Promises to Help (Not to Harm) a Non-Relative 
Friend in Legal Matters 
In 1980 the Court of Appeals in Stokes v. State 
held as improper a "promise not to harm (physically or 
emotionally) a near relative with whom the defendant naturally 
has a close bond of affection. "199 The Court specifically left 
open the issue of what "degree of closeness" the defendant 
must have with anon-relative friend who is the subject of the 
police promise or threat.2°o However, in 2002 the Court of 
Appeals in Pringle v. State held, in the context of a Fourth 
Amendment "attenuation" analysis, that a threatnotto arrest 
a non-relative, co-defendant would constitute a "coercive" 
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"inducement' '20 1 and, thus, implied that the subsequent 
confession was involuntary. 
The Court of Special Appeals in Bellamy v. State 
extended the exclusionary rule of Stokes regarding near 
relatives to a promise to help the defendant's fiance. 202 In 
Fowlerv. State, 203 the Court of Special Appeals held that a 
detective's exhortation to disclose the co-defendant's name, 
so that "the weight could be shared," was an improper 
inducement. However, the court found that the confession 
was admissible because the defendant had not relied on the 
inducement. In Jarrell v. State, the Court of Special Appeals 
held, in the context of consent to search under the Fourth 
Amendment, that the police promise to release a sick friend 
from jail caused the consentto be involuntary.2M 
The Supreme Court in Spano v. New York, although 
in the due process context, held as involuntary a confession 
induced by the police officer's statement that the police officer 
would probably lose his job if the defendant did not confess.205 
The Court held that the defendant's sympathy was "falsely 
aroused" because the interrogating officer was a childhood 
friend of the defendant.206 
i. Promises to Help a 'Wear Relative" in Non-Legal 
Matters 
In Stokes v. State, the Court of Appeals left open 
the possibility that itmay be improper to promise to help a 
"near" relative with matters not pertaining to the pending case 
orto any other case.207 The Court held as improper a "promise 
not to harm (physically or emotionally) a near relative with 
whom the defendant naturally has a close bond ofaifection''208 
A unaninlous Supreme Court in Lynumn v. Illinois, although 
a due process case., held a confession to be involuntary after 
the police told an arrested defendant that ifshe didnotconfess, 
her two children would be taken from her by the State, and 
her welfare payments would be cut off.209 
hl Reynolds v. State, the Court of Appeals found 
no impropriety with the police exhortation to the defendantto 
ten the truth in order to help the defendant's daughter, the 
victim, with her self-doubt over the prospect of no one 
believing her allegations of sexual abuse against the 
defendant.2l0 TIle Court labeled this promise as "col1ateral" 
because the statement had not "directly impacted" the 
defendant. The Court emphasized that the benefit of the 
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promise was not somethingthatthe "police would or would 
not do if the defendant made a statement. "211 
The Court of Special Appeals in Finke v. State also 
found no impropriety with a similar police exhortation that the 
defendant should admit the crime to spare his three-year-old 
grandson the necessity of having to testify against the 
defendant.212 ill Boyd v. State, the defendant asked to see 
her children before executing a written statement?13 The officer 
responded that she would be all owed to see her children 
after she completed and signed a written statement. 214 In 
holding that this was not an improper inducement, the Court 
of Special Appeals stated, "[ w]e know of no right on the part 
of a suspect in a murder case to interruptthe interview process 
in order that the suspect may visit with his or her children 
before continuing with the interrogation.''215 The Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals in Muniz v. State, found no inlpropriety 
with an officer's promises to get heIp from charities for 
defendant's pregnant wife and sick mother.216 
j. False Friend Scenario and Promises to Investigate 
Any Leads That The 
Defendant Provides in an Exculpatory Statement 
In a case decided several months before Hillard, 
the Court of Special Appeals in Rowe v. State examined a 
police statement that the victim was a "no-good-son-of-a-
bitch ... and that the only thing that [the detective] wanted to 
do real1y was to shake the hand of the man that murdered 
him ... .''217 The court held that this was not improper because 
the defendant could not have reasonably interpreted the 
statement as a "preliminary pardon.''218 Even a noted critic of 
many modern police interrogation techniques, Professor 
AlbertAlschuler, has acknowledged that the police "should 
be allowed to express false sympathy for the suspect, [and] 
blamethevictim.''219 
In Finke v. State, the Court of Special Appeals 
examined the police promise to investigate any leads the 
defendant provided. The court held that this promise was 
not improper because, ifit has any effect at aU, it would induce 
an exculpatory statement.220 The Court of Special Appeals 
came to the same conclusion on a similar set of facts in Clark 
v. State. 221 
k. False Statements or Unfulfilled Promises Which Are 
Othenvise Proper 
Generally, the Court of Appeals has held that 
deception, except "an overbearing inducement, is a 'valid 
weapon of the police arsenal. '''222 With respect to police 
deception, Maryland appellate courts apply the 
constitutional due process test of whether the defendant's 
will was overborne under the totality ofthecircumstances.223 
However, if the police lie about the law,224 the resulting 
confession will likely be deemed involuntary, especially if the 
lie pertains to the suspect's constitutional rights.225 
In Ford v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a 
"breach of faith" regarding a promise to tear up the detective's 
notes afterthe defendant confessed was not sufficient to render 
the confession involuntary.226 In Mitchell v. State, the Court 
of Special Appeals stated in dicta that it was not a significant 
factor in the voluntariness inquiry that the police did not follow 
through on their pronrise to getthe defendant a reduction in 
bail.227 
However, Professor White has argued that false or 
unfulfilled promises, which would otherwise not be improper, 
should not be pennissible and should render a subsequent 
confession involuntary. He analogized this situation with a 
defendant's rightto withdraw a guilty plea when the State has 
breached its end of the plea bargain.228 
I. Encouraging a Suspect to Adopt an "Accidental" 
Theory of the Case or to Admit to a Lesser Crime 
The ploy to encourage a suspect to admit to an 
accidental theory of the case was unarumously upheld in 1997 
by the Court of Appeals in a death penalty case. In Ball v. 
State, the Court upheld the technique of presenting the 
defendant with two opposing versions the facts.229 The first 
version presented the defendant as a diabolical criminal. The 
second version presented the defendant as a loving father, 
who had a ''tough life," and who shot the victim accidentally.230 
TIle Court classified this technique as a permissible fonn of 
deception, rather than an imp lied promise ofleniency and, 
thus, applied a "totality of the circumstances" test. 
In Smith v. State, the Court of Special Appeals 
held that the police statement, "the Court might take into 
consideration a version by the accused of the fire being 
accidental," was not an improper inducen1ent. 231 Nonetheless, 
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Professors Richard Of she and Richard Leo claim that this 
technique has played a partin eliciting some false confessions 
because the technique "relies on communicating a promise of 
leniency for its efficacy."232 
m. Promises Initiated by the Defendant 
In Hillard, the defendant's attorney appeared to have 
initiated the idea of the detective "going to bat" for the 
defendant. However, the Court did not mention this as a 
factor in finding involuntary a confession which resulted from 
the same promise made later by the detective.233 The Court 
ignored this factor and held that the detective's promise 
rendered the resulting confession involuntary. The Court of 
Special Appeals in Jones v. State held a confession to be 
involuntary even though the defendant initiated the subject of 
the police getting him "help. "234 Similarly, in Bellamy v. State, 
even though the defendant initiated the subject, the Court of 
Special Appeals held as involuntary a confession induced by 
a promise of help to secure the release of the defendant's 
fiance.235 
However, the Court of Special Appeals in Mitchell 
v. State stated that an important factor in holding that there 
were no improper inducements was that the "defendant 
volunteered to give information about [ another case] in return 
for certain things that he requested the po lice do for him. "236 
Several states have relaxed the per se rule on this basis.237 
n. Confession Induced By Valid Plea Agreement 
Between an Unrepresented Defendant and the 
Prosecutor. 
In 1986 the Court of Appeals in Wright v. State 
held as voluntary a statement of an unrepresented defendant 
which was induced by a plea bargain negotiated with a 
prosecutor shortly after the defendant was arrested.238 
Because the defendant specifically agreed that any of his 
statements made as part of the plea bargain, pursuant to 
Maryland Rule 4-243, would be admissible in the eventthat 
he withdrew fromtheplea,the Courtheldthatthese statements 
were admissible, as long as the State honored its end ofthe 
bargain?39 The Court conceded the next year that its decision 
in Wright was in the minority when compared to other 
jurisdictions around the country.240 
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6. Should Courts Consider the Likelihood of Certain 
Police Practices Causing an Unreliable or even False 
Confession? 
The likelihood of producing a false confession was 
the controlling test for the admissibility of confessions at 
conmlon law in England after the Restomtion in 1660.241 The 
Court in ReylWlds observed that "[t]he common law approach 
was to identifY inducements that might make a confession 
unreliable or even false. "242 F or a limited number of years in 
Maryland, between 1925 and 1943, the truthfulness of a 
confession was an important factor in the determination of 
voluntariness. In 1928 in Carey v. State, the Court of Appeals 
held that the "ultimate test to be applied in detennining the 
admissibility of the statement" is: "Was the situation produced 
by that evidence such that there was a reasonable probability 
that the accused would make a false statement or confession 
... ?"243 
Although the Court of Appeals has often explained 
that one underlyingmtionale of the common-law rule is that a 
"promise of some benefit is, of course, inherently 
untrustworthy,"244 the Court, since these early cases, has not 
actually examined the reliability of a particular confession, or 
the likeliliood that a particular police tactic would produce an 
unreliable confession. However, the Court of Appeals has 
not explicitly forbidden, under the common law, an analysis 
of the truthfubless of the confession, as the Supreme Court 
has done with respect to the due process analysis.245 
In the past six years, there has been a wave of 
scholarly articles concerning the phenomenon of false 
confessions.246 In one such study, Professors Of she and Leo 
analyzed sixty proven false, orprobab ly false, confessions.247 
Out of the thirty-threeproven false confessions, only eighteen 
(55%) were discovered before trial, five (15%) plead guilty, 
nine (27%) were convicted at trial, and only one (3 %) was 
acquitted.248 Sixteen out of the sixty involved cognitively 
disabled defendants.249 In the Washington D. C. area, the public 
awareness of the possibility of a false confession has increased 
as a result of a series of articles in the Washington Post on 
the lengthy, inconmmnicado interrogations sometimes 
employed in Prince George's County.250 
Despite this heightened concern, the scholarly litemture 
has only produced a relatively small number of documented 
false confessions which "can be explained ... primarily on 
32.1 U. BaIt L.F. 22 
the ground that the interrogator's promise provoked the 
suspect's confession. "251 Furthennore, there is "no sound 
empirical proof that such instances are widespread ''252 Even 
Of she and Leo concede that there has been no research' 'to 
quantifY the number and frequency offalse confessions or the 
mte at which they lead to miscarriages of justice.' '253 
Professor White has advocated that trial judges 
should evaluate the likeliliood that a particular police tactic, in 
geneml, would produce a false confession.254 The OfsheILeo 
article, which examined sixty purportedly false confessions, 
advocated that judges actually examine the reliability of each 
confession, provided that a videotape regime is in place.255 
The latter proposal has been widely criticized as being 
unworkable and invading the traditional role of the fact 
finder.256 
Judge Andrew Sonner recently suggested, in a 
dissenting opinion, the unreliability of a confession as a factor 
in examining an alleged threat to arrest the defendant's 
companions.257 Professor Magid, a critic of anecdotal studies 
purporting to show widespread instances offalseconfessions, 
nonetheless concedes that, at least with respect to deceptive 
police practices, "[t]here is a growing view that reliability is 
the appropriate focus of the debate."258 
D. The Jury Instruction on Voluntariness - Should the 
Jury Apply a Common-Law or Due Process Test? 
A jury in Maryland must decide two issues in 
considering a confession: its voluntariness and its reliability.259 
In 1976 in Dempsey v. State, the Court of Appeals, speaking 
through Judge Eldridge, restated these two roles: "'[The jury] 
has the final detennination, irrespective of the court's 
preliminary decision, whether or not the confession is 
voluntary, and whether it should be believed. '" 260 
The State's burden to prove voluntariness to the jury 
is not constitutionally required. 261 Since at least 1947,262 
the Court of Appeals has required this "greater safeguard," 
known as the "Massachusetts Rule,"263 in order to further 
Maryland's "strong public policy" against the use ofinvoluntary 
confessions.264 As such, the jury must decide voluntariness 
beyond a reasonable doubt before it even considers the 
reliability, or ''weight,'' of a confession.265 
The instruction for the "Statement oIDefendant" in 
the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, 3: 18, 
MICPEL, states: 
The State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the statement was freely and 
voluntarily made. A voluntary statement is 
one that, under all circumstances, was given 
freely .... To be voluntary it must have not 
been compelled or obtained as a result of 
any force, promises, threats, inducements 
or offers of reward .... In deciding whether 
the statement was voluntary, consider all of 
the circumstances surrounding the statement 
.... If you find beyond a reasonable doubt 
thatthe statement was voluntary, give it such 
weight as you believe it deserves. 
In considering voluntariness, should the jury apply the 
common-law or due process test, or both? The instruction 
leaves this and other questions unresolved. 
First, the instruction does not clarifY how the jury 
can reconcile the inherenttension between the third sentence, 
which generally encapsulates the conm10n-Iaw per se rule, 
and the second and fourth sentences, which generally refer to 
a modified due process, ''totality of the circumstances" teSt.266 
Second the two most recent cases from the Court of Appeals 
seem to provide conflicting dicta in relation to this question. 
In 1995 in Hof v. State,267 the Court seemed to favor a 
modified due process, ''totality of the circun1Stances" approach 
for the jury. However, in 1986 in Brittingham v. State, the 
COUlt seemed to endorse the per se approach by favorably 
quoting, among other cases, a 1948 case, Smith v. State, 
that had explicitly applied the per se common-law test to the 
jUly'S role in determining voluntariness.268 
Third, the instruction does not provide a definition 
for a "voluntary" statement beyond the assertion that it is a 
statement that is "freely" given. Fourth, the instruction omits 
important clarifYing language from both the common-law and 
due process tests. With respect to the due process test, the 
instruction does not contain commonly quoted language, such 
as "coerced," "overborne will," or "capacity for self-
determination [being] critically in1paired. "269 With respectto 
the common-law test, the instruction does not define improper 
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promises orthreats, nor does it mention "implied" promises 
or threats. 
Fifth, the instruction does not mention whether the 
voluntariness determination needs to be unanimous. For 
example, the instruction does not provide guidance on what 
might happen if the jury disagreed on which test to apply or if 
the jury was hung on the voluntariness issue.270 
As presently written, defense attorneys can argue to 
jurors thatthey should focus on the "mandatory" nature of 
the third sentence - that the jury "must" find a confession 
invohmtary ifit was obtained as a result of any police promise 
(not necessarily one that the Court of Appeals would define 
as "improper'). Defense attorneys can argue that, nrespective 
ofthe lack ofa "compe1[ing]" or coercive influence of the 
promise, the jury should disregard the confession "obtained 
as a result of' the promise. Of course, the prosecutor would 
respond that the jury "must" consider the "totality of the 
circumstances," pursuant to the fourth sentence of the 
instruction, not just the cause-and-effect of a promise. 
Without further clarification from the trial judge, jurors could 
easily consider both argun1ents to be reasonable interpretations 
of the instruction, thus creating a greater likeliliood of a divided 
jury on the question of voluntariness. 
This defense attorneys' argument is supported by 
the majority of the case law in Maryland. As mentioned 
above, the Court in Brittingham seemed to endorse the jury's 
use of the per se test. 271 Also, in three cases from 1948 to 
1960, the Court seemed to sanction the per se test for the 
jury's consideration of voluntariness. 272 
Furthennore, because the Court has expressly 
sanctioned 'JUlY reconsideration of the trial court's 
determination,"273 it can be argued that the jury should 
reconsider the two voluntariness tests in the same order that 
the trial court must consider them - with the per se test 
conducted prior to and separate from the due process 
test. 274 Thus, pursuantto this formulation, if the jury found the 
confession involuntary under the per se test, it would not need 
to consider the due process test. 
Lastly, there is some empirical support for the role of 
the per setest in protecting the defendant against jurors who 
are skeptical that improper promises can cause an involuntary 
or unreliable statement. 275 In Confessions in the 
Courtroom, 276 the authors conducted five empirical studies 
of jurors' reactions to promises and threats leading to a 
confession. The results consistently indicated that jurors 
32.1 U. Balt. L.F. 23 
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perceive 1hat a confession induced by a promise ofleniency is 
less suspectthan a confession induced by a threat of severe 
consequences. These results were consistent wi1h previous 
studies in which "people attribute more responsibility and 
freedom to a person for actions taken to gain a positive 
outcome than for similar actions aimed at avoiding 
punishment. "277 The authors concluded that this "positive 
coercion bias" can, and should, be corrected wi1h an instruction 
to the jury aboutthe coercive effect of certain promises. 278 
Because it appears that 1he jury must reconsider the 
trial judge's ruling on the per se test (either by itself or in 
conjunction with the due process test), the trial court should 
give a more detailed instruction on the elements of1he common-
law test. For instance, the trial court should instruct on which 
types of promises are deemed inlproper, and then proceed to 
explain the per se nature of the causation prong.279 
However, even if the per se test were explained in 
more detail to the jury, this would not alleviate the inherent 
tension in the instruction: How does the jury reconcile the per 
se test with the ''totality'' test? Should the jury be instructed 
that the common-law per se test should be applied prior to 
the "totality" test, as is mandated for a judge at the threshold 
stage of admissibility? Or should 1he jury merely be instructed 
that a promise can be coercive, but1he jury should still consider 
a promise as only one critical factor in the totality of the 
circumstances? lfMaryland were to adoptthis latter approach, 
the jury would essentially apply a modified due process 
analysis. 
Such a modified due process, "totality of the 
circumstances" test is supported by the Court's most recent 
case on the jury's evaluation ofvoluntariness. TheHofCourt 
seemed to endorse the due process, "totality of the 
circumstances" test where it traditionally had not applied - in 
conjunction with 1he common-law rule of Hillard: 
In detennining whether a confession is 
plagued wi1h any "coercive ba171acles, ""the 
standard is whether, under the totality of1he 
circUlllstances, 1he statement was given freely 
and voluntarily" .... Otherwise stated, the 
test of admissibility of [a] confession is 
whether [the will of the accused] was 
overborne at the time he confessed ... or 
whether his statement was "freely self-
determined .... Thus, a statement is 
32.1 U. Bait L.F. 24 
voluntary if it is induced by force, undue 
influence, impmperpromises, including any 
official promise which redounds to the 
benefit or desire of the defendant. "280 
The Court also emphasized another aspect of the 
voluntariness test which is not typically as important in the per 
se test: "The critical focus in an involuntariness inquiry is the 
defendant's state of mind. "281 Thus, as a result of the above 
quoted language, the Court appeared to eschew a jury 
instruction for voluntariness that is dominated by the per se 
test. 
Furthennore, it can be argued that the deterrence 
rationale, which is one of the underlying rationales of the per 
se test, at the threshold level of admissibility, does not seem 
appropriate at the jury level. As Judge Moylan observed, 
"[i]t is not the job of a jury 'to police the police. '''282 The 
Court of Appeals in both Blittingham283 andHof84 observed 
thatthepwposebehindthejury'sconsiderationofvoluntariness 
appears to be the "reliability" of the statement, rather than "to 
protect against government overreaching"285 - the deterrence 
rationale underlying1he exclusionary rule at1he threshold level 
of admissibility. Certain studies have shown that some 
improper promises that are forbidden by the conmlon-Iaw 
rule (short of promises of significant leniency) are not likely to 
cause unreliable confessions.286 Thus, applying the COlmnon-
law test, jurors will more often face the difficult task to 
"disregard a trustworthy, albeit involuntary, confession (1he 
thing that Jackson v. Denno said a jury was incapable of 
doing)."287 The "totality of the circumstances test" makes it 
less likely1hatjuroTS will face this problem identified in Jackson. 
Lastly, the defendant may not need the extra 
protections of the persetest. The defendant already enjoys 
several protections against unreliable statements at the 
threshold level of admissibility: the per se common-law 
voluntariness test itself, the due process voluntariness test, 
Miranda, and 1he Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 288 TIle 
latter two protections did not exist from 1948 through 1960 
when the Court of Appeals seemed to endorse the per se 
approach for the jury.289 
In conclusion, a middle ground between the two 
approaches can be found in Reynolds v. State, in which the 
Court quoted the Second Circuit's holding1hatthe voluntariness 
"inquiry in each case is whether such a promise overbears the 
suspect's will ... either alone or in conjunction with other 
factors.' '290 Thus, a' 'compromise" instruction should inform 
the jury that they could find the defendant's will to be 
overborne as a result of merely one improper promise 
because certain promises of leniency, especially with 
incarcerated defendants, can be highly coercive. Next, the 
jury should be instructed that if they do not believe that the 
promise alone caused an overborne will, they should consider 
other factors in the totality of the circumstances in determining 
voluntariness?91 
m. Conclusion 
The Court of Appeals made clear in Winder and 
Williams that it will apply a more restrictive application of 
the "totality of the circumstances" approach to certain 
improper promises. The Court of Appeals will presume 
coercion by essentially engaging in a cause-and-effect analysis, 
which has little, if anything, to do with whether the defendant's 
will was actually ovemome. However, many issues still remain 
unclear. 
While the case law slowly develops so as to fill in 
some of the ambiguities in the common-law standard in 
Mal)'land, defense attorneys and prosecutors can be assured 
that there are many arguments to be made on both sides with 
respect to most confessions. Practitioners can be assured 
that there are even more creative arguments to be made under 
Miranda, the Sixth Amendment, and the due process right 
to an attorney and to silence. Confession law is indeed far 
more complicated than expected 
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